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ABSTRACT
 
An industrial policy is "any government measure that prevents 
or promotes changes in the structure of an economy." This paper 
provides an overview of the issue, by focusing on how government 
can encourage productivity growth in the economy. 
By studying other countries we hope to learn how industrial 
policy might work in America. The obvious choice to model is 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but 
other countries, most notably the British and the French, have 
adopted certain pOlicies as well. On the whole, while Japan has 
been most successful, MITI may have more credit than is due, and 
countries such as France have failed in their industrial policy 
initiatives. Given America's reluctance to involve government in 
the management of the economy and the uncertain response of 
government commissions to crises in the past, the best approach 
would be to combine a Japanese MITI-like body with some power and 
an advisory British-style committee that must be checked by 
Congress and/or the president. 
Industrial policy should focus on several sectors of the 
economy. There are two ways that industrial policy is helpful. 
First, industrial policy can directly influence tariffs and non­
tariff barriers (NTBs), which can have a significant influence on 
productivity. This paper, however, only addresses the second 
aspect of industrial policy. What are the areas where productivity 
can be improved. They include infrastructure, education, science, 
technology, and R&D promotion. 
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The methodology is based on both economic and political 
theories. Underlying the economics is indifference curve analysis 
which postulates that American economic growth in overseas markets 
will depend on competitiveness, which in turn depends upon 
productivity. Politically, congresspeople will try to maximize 
their probability of getting re-elected. These two theories are 
incorporated into a system that ranks preferences on economic and 
political feasibility. Accordingly, since politicians are making 
the decisions, more weight is given to the political component, and 
the two feasibility rankings are added to come up with a 
feasibility score. This score is set against a null hypothesis, 
and the lower of the two scores should reflect Congressional 
preference. 
President"Clinton has made several proposals, including one 
for an Economic Security council. These proposal~ are evaluated 
for their political and economic feasibility. Conclusions will 
show that for the most part, Clinton's proposals are economically 
and politically feasible, compared to what the government currently 
does. 
There are problems, however, with the data, the methodology, 
and the various proposals. There are limits to what can be 
inferred from this study. These will be explored, and the need 
for more research will be examined, as well as what area would be 
focused on in the future. Now, however, this paper provides a 
general overview into a topic that is very current. 
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"Industrial policy" in the united states has long been a 
phrase associated with private firms in the manufacturing sector 
meaning the strategy that they use as a whole in order to maximize 
their profits. Since the early 1960's however, "industrial policy" 
means "any government measure that prevents or promotes changes in 
the structure of an economy. 111. Industrial policy is designed to 
promote one country's manufactured products in national and 
international markets. More and more companies want government to 
intervene and help them compete, because foreign firms, especially 
the Japanese, have the same advantage. Typically, this "policy" 
comes in the form of semi-protectionist tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, government subsidies for industry-wide R&D, and 
investment spending. 
This policy has proven very effective, as the "Japanese 
Economic Miracle" illustrates. Not surprisingly, others, such as 
members of the European Economic Community (EEC), have followed 
their example. They have also done well, especially in the global 
market. This increases the pressure for other countries to 
initiate their own comprehensive industrial policy, which snowballs 
the effect. In fact, it has become almost essential for 
governments to help increase their firms' global competitiveness 
as markets become increasingly global. 
Most of the gains realized by the rest of the world have come 
at the expense of the United states. This fact has led some 
scholars, politicians, and business leaders to call for the u.s. 
government to adopt its own industrial policy in order to compete 
1 
better in the global market. These people agree with Socialist 
author Arthur MacEwan as he says: 
Political control over the economy is certainly a 
necessary condition for meeting our economic goals, as 
much as staying alive is a necessary condition for 
leading a good life. Just as certainly, of course, 
political control, like staying alive, is not a 
sufficient condition. It just makes good things 
possible.:l 
As of 1983, 55 percent of business executives in a survey responded 
that they favored ,,\ some kind of government' intervention in 
dealing with the problems of basic industries in the United 
states."l Throughout the '80's and into the '90's, these calls 
have intensified. On a nationally syndicated TV show on 2 April 
1992, for example, Democratic nominee hopeful Bill Clinton flatly 
stated that "we need an economic policy."4 
On 3 November 1992 , Cl inton swept into the White House I 
campaigning on the promise of economic reform. Several new 
programs and reforms have been suggested by the new president, his 
supporters, and his critics. These proposals all have the same 
basic goal: they want to change the way American firms do business 
and make them more competitive and productive in the global 
economy. To do this, Clinton and others envision a new industrial 
policy for the United states, run by the federal government. While 
this has proven successful in Japan and Germany, in the United 
States it is a controversial concept. 
Any industrial policy that the United states would attempt to 
undertake must in theory and practice be both economically and 
politically feasible, or it has no chance of succeeding. Often, 
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however, what is economically viable is not politically feasible, 
and vice versa. Industrial policy, if done correctly, can overcome 
the gap between economic and political feasibility. It could also 
intensify the wedge between them if Congress and/or the Clinton 
administration adopt a policy that hurts the American economy, or 
if Congress simply refuses to pass an economically sound but 
politically damaging policy package. It is therefore imperative 
that a policy must meet both criteria of economic and political 
feasibility. 
The Arguments For Industrial Policy 
Proponents of government-sponsored industrial policy often 
argue one of two ways. First, they will argue that American 
competitiveness is decl ining , which is weakening our economic 
position in the global community and stagnating economic growth. 
Therefore, there needs to be some external force to promote market 
solutions to help America's economy grow again. A second common 
argument focuses more on international fair play. A government 
agency or agencies that can promote the same type incentives for 
domestic firms that other countries' agencies' can will allow u.s. 
firms to be more competitive inherently, because they would then 
be dealing on a level playing field. Both arguments provide ample 
support for why there should be an industrial policy in the United 
states. 
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The first argument cites statistical evidence to support its 
position. These statistics show that American competitiveness, as 
proxied by American productivity, has fallen relatively to the rest 
of the world. Chart 1 shows output per Hour growth rates for 
several developed countries. America's output per hour rateshave 
grown the least. These rates, which are used to approximate 
productivity, are growing slower than the rest of the world. 
Statistics such as these compel many executives and 
policymakers to call for a comprehensive set of government policies 
that can address these issues of falling productivity and 
competitiveness, falling share of world GNP, and so on. The trade 
deficit is also cited as evidence that our economy is losing 
competitiveness; America is importing more and exporting less, and 
this reflects' on worsening competitiveness in international 
markets. 
The impetus for industrial policy from this first argument 
comes from the fact that the factors that affect competitiveness, 
such as productivity, are not being adequately dealt with in the 
market. If the problems in productivity cannot be addressed 
through the market, then there must be some other solutions that 
can deal with them. This is where the government can step in and 
augment the open market by increasing incentives to enhance the 
growth of productivity and/or competitiveness. Changes in 
productivity can cause similar changes in competitiveness. If the 
factors that affect productivity are not being corrected, then the 
factors that deal with competitiveness are not being corrected. 
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The second argument attacks the lack of industrial policy from 
an advantage standpoint. Basically, the argument is that the rest 
of the countries have an industrial policy that provides them with 
certain advantages that U.S. firms don't have. As a result, they 
are better able to compete in the marketplace. In order to "level 
the playing field, II our firms need the same type of government 
support. This aspect of industri 1 policy, though, is not within 
the scope of this paper; the focus will be on industrial policy 
that deals with increasing productivity. 
In order to analyze any industrial policy, it is helpful at 
first to understand the history of industrial policy will highlight 
what types of policy have been tried in the past both in the United 
States and other countries, notably Japan. Second, the contents 
of industrial policy are explored. Third, the theories of economic 
and political viability are developed, followed by the method of 
analysis. Finally, the industrial policy analyzed will be the the 
Clinton agenda pertaining to competitiveness and productivity 
concerns. Analysis will show that most of the proposals are valid 
both economically and politically, compared to what the government 
currently does. 
II. LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
Most other countries have attempted a form of industrial 
policy, which America can learn a great deal from. Primarily, 
though, they have followed one of two models, either the Japanes~ 
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model or the British model. The Japanese model focuses on an 
administrative agency that can direct the economy and foreign 
penetration into domestic markets, a MIT!-type agency. The Br i tish 
model of industrial policy, on the other hand, centers on an 
"information/consensus agency" like Great Britain's National 
Economic Development Council. s These two models offer different 
roads to industrial policy. Both have mixed records, though. 
The Japanese Experience 
At the end of World War II, the Japanese economy was in 
shambles, and subject to the rule of the occupying American forces 
stationed there. American forces had distinct goals for the 
Japanese economy: 
After WW:II, America tried to keep Japan an agrarian 
nation, but this approach was abandoned in 1947 and again 
when occupation ended with the signing of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. 'The initial policy to 
discourage all the seeds of its war potential and keeping 
Japan as a land of agriculture and insignificant commerce 
proved too costly for the U.S. Treasury.' [Ozaki, 1992, 
p. 7] 6 
After this policy was abandoned, the Japanese began to develop 
their own economy and institutions immediately. On 25 May 1949, 
they established the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) to oversee the international economic policies of Japan, and 
on 24 November 1949, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law (FEFTCL) was passed. 7 These laws, and others, such as the 
Export-Import Transactions Law which actually allowed cartels to 
be formed under certain conditionsB , all intended to strengthen the 
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Japanese economy by semi-protectionist industrial policy means. 
u.s.	 foreign policy permitted this advantageous behavior: 
until the 1960's the United states helped the recovery 
and development in Japan by keeping the u.s. market open 
for Japanese goods, while at the same time accepting 
Japanese protectionist policies..•. The United states 
accepted such asymmetrical benefits because of a 
cOIontitment to Japanese recovery, because it 
expected to benefit from the reductions when the exchange 
controls were removed, and because it sought to maintain 
the momentu~ of establishing a more open trading system. 9 
America expected to benefit from the post-protectionist era that 
would ensue after Japan had firmly re-established its economy. 
This American policy, coupled with the protection itself, provided 
Japanese firms with favorable domestic and foreign market 
advantages from which to grow. Japan took advantage of it. 
Against this backdrop of both favorable domestic and foreign 
government policy, the Japanese Economic Miracle occurred. This 
~iracle consisted of annual real growth of Gross National Product 
(GNP) of 10% for every year from 1950 to 1970. Among the reasons 
explaining this unprecedented phenomenon are Japan's ability to 
absorb and adapt foreign technology, the availability of labor due 
to movement out of agriculture and a growing population, heavy 
investment in manufacturing, and the previously mentioned 
government policies of export expansion and import protection .10 
Japan went from a minor economic power in 1960, when they had less 
than 3% of the world GNP, to a major force in the 1980's, as Japan 
accounted for 10% of world GNP and 8.3% of world trade. ll 
Industrial policy receives a lot of credit for some of the 
successes of the Japanese economy during this period. For example, 
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the government targeted industries such as steel, oil refining, 
petrochemicals, automobiles, aircraft, industrial machinery, 
electronics, and computers, and promoted them "through tax 
incentives as well as financing provided by government lending 
institutions and private savings encouraged by government 
policies. tl 12 Industrial policy in Japan improved productivity of 
Japanese firms, which thereby increased its international 
competitiveness. As Japan's competitiveness increased, they had 
an open market waiting in the United states that absorbed their 
goods, which increased international trade in the favor of Japan 
and at the expense of the united states. 
Japan also invested heavily into its private sector. This 
gave firms the capital necessary to expand business, often beyond 
the country's' borders. There was also reinvestment into new 
technologies and procedures that would increase productivity. Base 
technologies from foreign countries, especially basic technoloqies 
from the united states, would be adapted to Japanese production 
techniques and brought to the international market quicker than the 
United States could bring it. These industrial policies also 
increased productivity, and allowed Japan to significantly increase 
its competitiveness in the global arena. This has resulted in 
considerable economic growth for the country. 
These effects were augmented by other pOlicies that the 
government undertook for the sake of industrial policy that 
increased competitiveness, namely the use of tariffs and NTB's by 
MITI and other organizations. Contrary to popular thought, the 
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tariff is not the main protectionist strategy that Japan opts for. 
It is relatively minor, and usually ineffective. The use of 
tariffs also provided political problems for Japan, as the GATT was 
making strides in eliminating tariffs in other countries, Japan 
still had relatively high tariffs13 ; as the Japanese economy grew 
and grew, this became increasingly more unacceptable to the rest 
of the world. 
The situation finally reached the beginning of resolution in 
1959, when at an International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference in 
washington, D.C., the united states "reminded Japan that the pace 
of her trade liberalization was unjustifiably slow in light of her 
growth records and balance-of-payments position. 1114 As the GATT 
conference began in Tokyo later that winter, these discussions 
continued. After that, "these experiences compelled the Japanese 
government to realize that as an international bargaining tool, if 
nothing else, the early liberalization of her trade became a matter 
of necessity. n 15 
As a result Japan did start to lower her formal tariffs, and 
continued to do so as a condition of admission into the IMF in 
1964. 16 They continued to be reduced, and Japan participated in 
the GATT Kennedy, and Tokyo rounds, until by 1988, Bela Balassa and 
Marcus Noland argue that "on the whole, tariff rates on non­
agricultural products in Japan approximate those of the EEC and the 
U.S."n For the most part, this is still true. 
The Japanese markets remain relatively closed to foreign 
competition today, however. The United States and other developed 
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countries believed that if they could force Japan to lower their 
tariffs, they could still make significant inroads to the Japanese 
markets. However, this line of reasoning was faulty, because the 
main elements of protection the Japanese employed were NTB' s. 
Consequently, "when Japanese tariffs were significantly reduced in 
the GATT Kennedy Round, there were still significant barriers to 
entry in the Japanese market. nlS These were the NTB's that made up 
most of the industrial policy's protectionist strategy to increase 
Japanese competitiveness. 
NTB's include n all transparent border measures that directly 
or indirectly limit imports. "19 This can include, but is not 
limited to, such restraints as quotas, Voluntary Export Restraints 
(VERs) and Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs), and tariff 
quotas, which increase the duty on goods after a specific amount. 
other types of NTB's are more informal, and include "administrative 
guidance" requirements, customs procedures, standards, testing,· and 
certification requirements, publ'c procurement practices that are 
primarily closed to the foreign competition, and defense of 
depressed industries. 20 
Unlike the GATT reduction on tariffs, there have not been many 
agreements on what to do about NTB's. The Tokyo Round of the GATT 
(1973-79) came up with the first set of codes on NTB's, but this 
has not really limited their use. The Second Maekawa Report, issued 
in 1987, recognized the need for Japan to liberalize its practices 
in, among other things, importing manufactured goods, tariffs, the 
government procurement system to allow some imports, and 
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agriculture. 41 This would allow for fairer competition in the 
Japanese markets. 
Japan is not the only country to employ NTB's as a defensive 
tactic in order to give domestic firms a little edge. The EEe and 
the U.S. are equally culpable. Japan's more extensive 
restrictions, however, often mean the difference in cost of a 
Japanese good, as opposed to a foreign good. Where the NTB's are 
relatively low, as they generally are in the U.S., they usually 
cannot promote such an effect. This has given Japan a relative 
advantage over the U.S. in terms of market penetration, which has 
led to some of the gains that the Japanese have made. 
Japan has developed a very successful industrial policy around 
a few central principles. The government should help the private 
sector increase productivity, which will help increase 
international competitiveness. The government should also help 
stimulate investment and R&D spending, and help private firms 
develop new technologies that get to the market faster than the 
competition. It should also help support domestic industry by use 
of tariffs and NTB's that help limit foreign penetration into the 
domestic market, without provoking adverse reaction from the 
international community. 
Some authors have concluded that Japanese "industrial policy" 
is not as successful as it appears to be. As Murray Weidenbaum 
points out, MITI has not helped all the successful industries in 
Japan, and has actually hurt some industries that it was trying to 
help.u He further states that: 
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"perhaps the secret of the Japanese miracle has not been 
the government's efforts to influence individual 
industries. Rather, the successes of individual Japanese 
firms have occurred in an enviroment of low tax rates on 
investment, vigorous domestic competition, and heavy 
emphasis on industrial engineering and process 
improvement. lt :l.:l 
He concludes that MITI industrial policies of industry-specific 
targeting are overrated, and even detrimental to the industry in 
question as an industrial policy tool. 
However, Weidenbaum's conclusion is entirely consistent with 
the theoretical neoclassical conclusions about how to implement 
industrial policy to augment an economy. The Japanese have 
provided a stable environment conducive to economic growth by 
providing lower tax rates on investment, saving incentives~4 , 
government - private sector cooperation on R&D and technology 
development projects, and favorable international terms of trade. 
Japan has thus been able to increase productivity and 
competitiveness, which has greatly increased their economic 
standing. 
other Countries 
A second type of policy is modeled after a British ministry, 
the National Economic Development Council. It has no real 
administrative power, but can only make recommendations. In order 
for this arrangement to be effective, the commission members will 
have to be in consensus to make their recommendations to Congress 
and the President. Achieving consensus on economic issues is 
notoriously impossible. The first task that such a committee would 
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have to make is what goals to set, and the representatives from 
business, government, and labor may never agree what goals should 
be targeted, due to their varied interests. 
There are then significant problems with either type of 
industrial policy. Each policy, if done wrong, could severely hurt 
America's economy. However, if done right, the benefits from such 
a policy could result in increased economic growth and a healthier 
American economy. Which policy, if either, is right for the U.S.? 
What should the decision be based on? What factors should be 
considered? 
What Can America Learn? 
An American industrial policy should take into account the 
country's history of past commissions without any administrative 
power. On the whole, they have not been very successful, and when 
they have, they have avoided the key issues. For example,· the 
1979-81 Steel Tripartite Committee "did not deal with the subject 
of labor-management concessions. It focused on government aid to 
the industry. IPS This committee did not even deal with the issue 
it was created to address. Nor is this a singular occasion in 
American politics. Consider Kennedy's Advisory Committee on Labor­
Management Policy, which never did what it set out to d026 , or 
Carter's Economic Revitalization Board, which never meta7 • 
It would appear, then that commissions which have no 
regulatory or administrative power go unnoticed and do not help 
alleviate the problems they were commissioned to address. It would 
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then appear that an agency, if established in an American 
industrial policy, would need some sort of administrative power in 
order to be effective. However, these commissions can have too 
much power, and in America, a country where, as Alexander Hamilton 
found out in his experiment with the National Bank, the populace 
is inherently distrustful of government intervention into the 
economy, there would be a significant loss of popular support for 
a bureau such as MITI. 
A Japanese-type administration indeed brings its own set of 
problems. First, the problem of the disputed effectiveness of MITI 
itself shows that this type of policy may not be as effective as 
it seems. Second, the experience of France's Ministry for 
Industrial and Scientific Development shows that such policies may 
not be successful at all. They are however very costly to 
implement, so the government should make sure that its taxpayers' 
money isn't being wasted on a program doomed to failure. 
There is room, however, for compromise for a commission that 
is going to set industrial policy. First, as suggested by the 
Brit~sh model, the commission should try and map out a direction 
for the economy; which way does the commission see the economy 
going, Where do they want to be, and how are they going to get 
there? Second, give it some, but not too much or too little, 
regulatory power. The committee should not be able to direct 
government money to specific industries; they should be allowed to 
make such recommendations to Congress, if they so desire, though. 
This commission should nevertheless have the power to set 
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macroeconomic policy goals in conjunction witn the Federal Reserve 
Board (the Fed), in order to make sure that an environment 
conducive to investment is maintained as much as possible. 
The committee must develop a cogent strategy for improving 
American competitiveness for American firms. The committee should 
also consider how to properly promote investment and savings within 
the economy, and work with the Departments of Education, 
Transportation, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury to 
determine how they can help the economy. Some committee members 
should be from these respective departments as well, as they are 
all areas that help the economy grow in the long run. By doing 
this, and providing incentives for economic growth, this type of 
committee will combine both aspects of other agencies: it will have 
some regulatory power and the ability to make recommendations for 
the Congress to act on, but it will essentially be a committee to 
establish where economic priorities should be and provide a long­
run direction for the American economy and plan on how to get 
there. 
The American policy body should also have the ability to 
impose customs procedures, patent requirements, and other types of 
NTB's so that they can increase the competitiveness of domestic 
firms. The committee can weigh the benefits of such policy against 
the costs and decide on an appropriate policy that will not hurt 
the American economy. Congress should still have power to set 
actual tariffs and VERs and VRAs that require ratification. Here, 
though, the commission should have regulatory power in this area. 
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An American industrial policy commission, then, should be a 
conglomeration of British and Japanese models of policy agencies 
to handle the distinct problems facing the American economy. What 
areas of the economy should they look at? What kind of proposals 
will they be looking at? How will these proposals be handled? 
III. CONTENTS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Industrial policy focuses on one goal: to increase American 
international competitiveness. In order to do this, an American 
industrial policy should include elements that will help 
productivity grow. This is further subdivided into three areas, 
infrastructure investment, education/human capital investment, and 
science and technology/R&D investment. These three areas reflect 
components of productivity that have declined in recent years. By 
improving these factors, productivity should increase, which should 
then increase American competitiveness, which should help ,the 
American economy grow, especially in the international community. 
When making policy proposals, the lawmakers first have to 
target what areas they want to look at. An example industrial 
policy is included in Table 1. Obviously, the policy will probably 
want to set up some sort of coordinating agency just discussed. 
Next, certain areas need to be targeted so that the government can 
subdivide and offer proposals for the specific areas, instead of 
trying a blanket approach. Obviously, productivity will be a major 
concern. ConSUlting Table 1, other areas of importance include the 
infrastructure, education, and science and technology including R&D 
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TABLE 1 
An Approach to Industrial Policy 
Basic	 Approach 
1.	 Achieving economic growth via a partnership among labor, 
small business, larger corporations, universities, and 
government. 
2.	 Government plays a creative leadership role. 
Major	 Components 
1.	 A Broad-Based Investment Program
 
Revitalize basic industries.
 
Expand growth industries.
 
Create an environment encouraging investment.
 
Make sure taxes encourage savings. 
Make sure everyone pays fair share. 
Invest in new technologies. 
Establish goal of committing certain % of GNP to R&D 
Provide incentives to entrepeneurs who undertake 
high-yield but risky R&D. 
Human	 Capital investment. 
More $ for college loan programs. 
More competitive faculty salaries in shortage areas. 
Invest in pUblic infrastructure. 
2.	 Managed Transitions . 
Give incentives to employers/unions who retrain workers. 
Expand co-op efforts to help workers relocate to new jobs. 
Provide adjustment assistance to workers to acquire 
new skills. 
Undertake efforts to train hard to employ youths. 
3.	 An Economic Cooperation Council 
Should have ability to assess futre needs, and build 
a partnership around solutions to major economic problems. 
Should combine economic and political considerations. 
Must have wide spread bipartisan support from business and 
government, as well as labor. 
Its	 purpose is to establish our national economic goals, 
map out a strategy, and marshal our resources for 
meeting them. 
=======~========================================================~======= 
Source:	 Weidenbaum, Murray L. Business, Government, and the Public. 
3rd. ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 242 
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concerns. These areas have their own unique concerns and problems, 
but they all are vital to economic well-being. Their problems 
should then be addressed in a forum considering the problems of 
industry. As the sample outline in Table 1 suggests, they shall 
be included here, as well. 
The Administrative Agency 
Research indicates that best type of American policy to adopt 
will be one that can have a little regulatory power, but be 
primarily an advisory board that can set certain goals for the 
economy. To this end, President Clinton has proposed an Economic 
Security Council (ESC), "similar to the National Security council. 
[NSC]"n The NSC is a statutory agency created in 1947 to "advise 
the president· and to help him coordinate the activities of the 
major foreign policy agencies. 11 29 The goal of the NSC is to 
coordinate all the appropriate agencies under a single foreign 
policy.30 Presumably, an ESC would have the same type of job: 
coordinate the various agencies involved under one cohesive 
economic policy. 
Just as the NSC involves the president, the vice president, 
the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretaries of State 
and Defense, the director of the CIA, and the national security 
advisoe\ the ESC should include the president, the vice president, 
the Fed chairman, the secretaries of Education, Transportation, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury, and a national 
economic advisor. It should also include, however, Senators and 
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Congresspeople from both parties, private corporation leaders, 
labor union leaders, and small business representatives. While 
this is quite a large committee, it will represent a good mix 
of pUblic/private, labor/management, and executive/legislative/ 
bureaucratic cross-sections that can air out their own views on 
economic policy matters. President Clinton has not yet specified 
any such committee organization, however. One of his campaign 
promises on 13 August 1992 to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council 
was to "create an Economic Security Council, similar to the 
National Security Council."u He has yet to act on that promise.O 
This agency would most likely replace the Vice President's 
Competitiveness Council. Congress has cut funding and has 
threatened to eliminate the office altogether, because of its slant 
to business during the Bush presidency. The Council issued 
recommendations in favor of government non-intervention in the 
•economy, and other "pro-business" recommendations33 Also, i tdid 
not have any regulatory power, and was a very weak organization 
politically, as well, that faced a hostile Congress, and was led 
by a politically impotent vice president. Hence, the ESC proposed 
here would be better positioned to listen to the concerns of all 
groups, and be politically well~balanced so neither party eliminate 
the COuncilor deny funding for purely political reasons, as 
appears to be the case with the Competitiveness Council. 
The agency proposed by Clinton, the ESC, offers many of the 
advantages already discussed about a mixture of Japanese and 
British agency models, if implemented as described. First, it has 
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Iittle or no direct regulatory power, but it is more than a 
thinktank for policymakers. Second, the mechanism is different, 
with the Council making its recommendations to the president and 
Congress, so that cooperation between the two branches of 
government can be fostered. Third, it is definitely designed to 
coordinate economic policy, which is of vital importance in the 
government. These aspects of the ESC are consistent with the 
committee approach developed earlier, with less regulatory power 
than envisioned, but maybe even more effective, if the Council can 
be put into effective practice. 
The agency approach is one of many made in the recent 
campaign. Several other proposals were made as well, concerning a 
variety of issues that affect the nation's economic health. These 
issues include'productivity, infrastructure investment, education 
reform, and science and technology policy that includes R&D. These 
areas are all in need of different types of proposals. 
productivity Concerns 
Looking back at Chart 1, notice that it graphs output per hour 
over different time periods. output per manhour is a common 
measure of productivity. others include output and hourly 
compensation as in Charts 2 and 3, respectively. Output is the 
most direct measure of what a country produces, and can reflect 
productivity , although not as accurate as output per manhour. 
Hourly compensation is a proxy for the average wage rate, which 
theoretically reflects productivity, as well, and can proxy it, 
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too. On Chart 2, America falls in the middle of growth, but on 
Chart 3, it falls dead last out of the 12 countries surveyed, as 
it is on Chart 1. These charts show America's lagging 
productivity, and has caused economists to ask what has caused this 
drop. 
The answers, as can be expected, are quite varied. Some of 
the literature focuses on technical change, as SolowJ ·, Romer35 , and 
Ethier36 The basic conclusion from these authors is that technical• 
change, not a change in the labor/capital ratio, is responsible for 
much of the productivity growth, although the magnitude of this 
change is disputed. Other authors, such as Abramovitz37 and 
Nelson38 argue that another force is at work. Collectively, their 
argument, know as convergence theory, states that productivity 
levels of countries will tend to converge over time. The United 
states, which has led this category for most of the century, is 
just experiencing a natural phenomenon. 
Convergence theory probably plays some role in the 
explanation. As Nelson states, though, "the 'followers' spend a 
higher percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GOP) on R&D than the 
'leader' (the United States). n 39 If this is the case, then bringing 
R&O spending in line to a similar percentage of GOP, would break 
this trend of convergence. Therefore, there is a stronger element 
than convergence that plays a role in productivity changes. If it 
is technical change, or a change in the labor/capital ratio, then 
they can be made targets for policies that can improve these 
statistics, and thereby increase productivity growth. 
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Productivity has been a topic where several policies have been 
proposed, as well. Some proposals cite the link between 
productivity and infrastructure investment4o others cite• 
knowledge and education41 still others cite science and• 
technology, along with R&D4'. All three of these areas can help 
increase productivity growth, in the medium to long run. It is 
therefore useful to look to these separate areas to see how the 
government can help enhance productivity. 
Infrastructure 
Some call the lack of recent infrastructure investment 
"America's Third Deficit,,·3 to show just how important the 
infrastructure is to the American economy. As David Aschauer says: 
Ilbecause the elements of core infrastructure are intrinsic to 
almost every sector of private production, they are especially 
influential in the determination of total national economic 
output. It·· ThUS, infrastructure investment is seen as a major 
player in productivity growth. Yet infrastructure investment has 
fallen off. As a result, so has productivity growth, according to 
proponents of this theory. 
President Clinton, recognizing this, has proposed that 
infrastructure spending be increased as much as $134 billion in the 
next four years. 45 This is part of his long-term plan to help 
revitalize the economy. The $134 billion would be spent on road 
improvements, and new roads and rails, including block grants to 
states for infrastructure investment 4e • Some of his long-range 
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goals include a fiber optic network that links all homes, 
businesses, and schools by 2015, and rigorous investment strategies 
for the future. 
This plan may run into problems, though, in getting passed 
through Congress. First, according to some, the deficit must be 
taken care of before public infrastructure investment will have its 
effect. 4? The deficit in and of itself is an almost inconceivably 
big obstacle; if that hurdle must be in effect cleared before 
meaningful investment can take place on the infrastructure, then 
government is going to let infraStructure investment oontinue its 
downward trend and tackle the larger problem of the deficit and not 
waste the money on infrastructure investment. If, however, 
infrastructure investment is not crowded out by the deficit, then 
the infrastructure investment can have a very real effect on the 
economy, if it does not add to the national debt. 
Education 
Former President Bush said: "Education is the one investment 
that means more for our future because it means the most for our 
4Schildren. U Current President Bill Cl inton and several other 
prominent figures in the American pUblic found education to be the 
number one priority facing America today.49 Admittedly, Bush and 
Clinton did not agree on much, but they both agree that eduoation 
is a very important concept. After all, education is, in the long 
run, R&D. 5(1 Experience further indicates that it may become 
increasingly more important, as well. As an economy matures, its 
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focus shifts from manufacturing to service oriented jobs, at least 
prima facie in the United states and the EEC. Service sector jobs 
generally require more and more educated workers in order for them 
to grow.5l. As the service sector in the U.S. continues to grow, 
the need for a more and better educated work force will also 
continue to grow. 
It seems that nearly everyone agrees that American schools 
need improvement. Statistics abound that American schools are 
being outperformed by foreign competition in sUbjects such as math 
and science. Yet our Congress cannot agree on the solution to one 
of the biggest problems we as Americans face. Bush wanted to be 
lithe Education President, II but the Congress, controlled by the 
Democrats, never fully considered his proposals. When they did 
compromise with the GOP, as on the NSIA, the Democrats reneged on 
their concession at the last minute, leaving the GOP congresspeople 
angry and the legislation dead in the water. 
The first problem American schools must face is developing a 
national educational philosophy. As David Steiner says: II by 
decentralizin9 education, we admit that no overarching substantive 
narrative binds the nation, that no inherited wisdom offers a 
universally persuasive vision of educated citizens. liS. By not 
having a national focus, then, there is no comprehensive philosophy 
that underpins the education American children receive, short of 
local wisdom. The country cannot then expect uniformity in quality 
of education or the availability of programs to all youth, because 
as communities surely differ, their programs and outcomes will also 
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differ. Education reform cannot succeed either, as the differences 
in individual programs can alter the effect national policies have 
on locally run school systems. Therefore, a national focus and 
philosophy can foster uniformity in quality and quantity of 
education, and equal application of government policies across the 
country. 
After this initial problem is addressed, several other 
questions still remain. First, how can the federal government 
improve the quality education for everybody? What must students 
learn to be competitive in the global economy? With few financial 
resources available, are there valid, low-cost ideas?63 These are 
just a few of the questions that Clinton's education policy must 
address over the next four years. 
The first-question stems from the national philosophy. The 
biggest contribution the federal government can make at this stage 
is to develop a comprehensive educational philosophy that 'can 
achieve a large consensus among the electorate. After this, the 
federal government can set up national standards for schools and 
set up new and innovative programs for schools to use to improve 
the quality of educational services available. These programs, 
however, can only supplement the local school initiatives, because 
the primary source of funding is not the federal government, but 
the local school systems themselves. The biggest contribution at 
the federal level will be to focus education in America on the same 
set of goals and educational maxims that can promote uniformity in 
school systems across the country. 
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Second, what should students learn in order to be competitive 
in the global economy? According to the Department of Labor Report 
issued on 2 July 1991, Students should master the 5 "competencies" 
-- reading, writing, math, speaking, and listening. Also, students 
should be able to think creatively, make decisions, solve problems, 
and reason. Schools should help develop responsibility, self­
esteem, sociability, and integrity among the students, as well. 54 
Labor lists these as the minimum requirements for people to be able 
to be competitive in the global labor markets. These goals can 
serve as basic guidelines for a national philosophy of education, 
and national requirements can be developed from them, as well. 
Third, with few financial resources, are there valid low-cost 
innovations? The answer is yes. Conservative Republicans have 
been pushing for public/private school choice with no success over 
the last four years, despite the fact that it is a relatively low­
cost solution to education problems (Democrats, by way of contrast, 
have often pushed for complete federal funding of programs already 
in place, such as Head Start). 55 Intense partisanship and a 
gridlocked Congress, and House Education and Labor committee are 
often cited as the reason for inaction on this particular program, 
and similar proposals of the Bush Administration. 56 
Other innovations are possible, though, without being as 
politically divisive as school choice vouchers. These programs 
center around encouraging parents to play an active role in their 
children's education. To this end, Patrick Welsh, himself a 
schoolteacher, observes that: "the kids who do well, whether they 
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be rich or poor, have one thing in common: parents or some other 
adult in their lives who have put a premium on education and have 
pushed them. 11 57 Therefore, getting parents involved and interested 
will help improve the schools -- without specific federal aid for 
education -- by improving attitudes toward education from the home 
front. Obviously, not all students start out equally from a family 
standpoint, either, given current trends in family structure. 
However, programs to address these problems, although important to 
education and increasing the economic well-being of the lower-class 
and single-parent households, are not within the scope of this 
paper. What is within its scope, however, is what has our new 
President has promised to improve education in order to improve 
competitiveness in the long run. 
Clinton has focused on education as one of four major target 
areas for his administration.!l8 To this end, he has several ideas 
on ways to improve education and human capital investment. These 
include improving early childhood education, revamping financial 
aid, and job training/apprenticeship proqrams. Sg Other proposals 
include a European-style tax cut for corporations sponsoring worker 
training. These programs have three different foci: making sure 
kids can start school relatively equally, making sure college is 
affordable for all, and providing training for good jobs for non­
college-bound youths. Programs such as these, it is argued, can 
do a lot for advancing future prosperity. 60 
In improving early childhood education, Clinton wants programs 
such as Head start to be fully implemented. All too often, poorer 
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children, especially from the inner cities with the poorest school 
systems in the nation, start school at a disadvantage due to their 
poverty. In order for these children to have a chance to compete 
in their future, special programs like Head start must be fully 
implemented. other proposals, such as child care subsidies or tax 
incentives, can help, too. As child care becomes more affordable, 
more single mothers, the most impoverished demographic group, can 
afford to work instead of staying home raising their children. 
This allows, them to rise out of poverty, which increase the chance 
of the children to be better educated through a better home 
atmosphere, etc. By focusing on the child care and preschool 
years, Clinton, like other liberals, hopes to increase the pre­
school and early childhood education, most of which goes on outside 
the home, and can be a very important determinant of future success 
for the child. 
The second target of the Clinton administration concerns ·the 
rising costs of college. As the service sector becomes 
increasingly predominant in America, more and more education is 
needed. Thus, more students will go into higher education of some 
type. As demand for education increases, higher learning 
institutions need more resources, which raises the cost of higher 
education. This is a trend which has spiralled upward in recent 
years in America. 
However, this is only partially true in reality. The supply 
of college students is increasing, because more and more, companies 
simply cannot hire workers straight out of high school. This trend 
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is only partially offset by the rising costs; most students and 
families simply have to pay the increase. Those that are forced 
out of education, though, are going to be the lower class students 
without a lot of resources at their disposal, arguably the one 
group of students who could benefit from going to college the most. 
Students do receive a lot of federal student loans and grants. 
However, it still may not be enough to offset the cost of college 
if it is anything less than the full amount. Other needy students 
who need just as much financial aid, may not, under the current 
restrictions, be getting enough aid to allow them to go to school. 
For these reasons, President Clinton has proposed to revamp 
the federal student financial aid system. 61 His proposals include 
working off student loans by government community service hours, 
and making the'aid received more "equitable". These programs are 
intended to allow more students the opportunity to attend college 
and better prepare themselves for the job markets of the future. 
Obviously, as students become better educated (and more 
knowledgeable), their productivity will increase, which will help 
America be more competitive globally. 
The third and final focal point of his education/human capital 
policy is the plight of the non-college bound youth. As the 
service sector demands a better educated work force, high school 
graduates simply do not possess the required skills. This leaves 
only blue collar-type manufacturing and other industrial jobs open 
that are good enough to make a living. These jobs, as 
manufacturing dwindles, simply are not available to accommodate the 
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needs of those graduating high school each year. As a result, 
high school graduates that do not go to college face an 
increasingly bleak job market and future. Clinton's job training/ 
apprenticeship program aims to alleviate this troublesome trend. 
As he promised the United Auto Workers convention in San Diego on 
15 June 1992, "for the kids who don't want to go to college, we'll 
restore the dignity of blue-collar work by guaranteeing an 
apprenticeship program to every non-college bound student in the 
U. S • ,,63 
President Clinton offers several new programs to increase the 
future competitiveness of America, through various policies in 
infrastructure and human capital/education investment. He also 
highlights a third area that can be just as important in shoring 
up American competitiveness in the near future, science and 
technology. Once, America dominated these areas, but now others 
have caught up. By inclUding a science and technology policy, that 
also includes R&D policies, America can further improve its 
competitive position in the international economy. 
Science and Technology 
In the period immediately prior to WWII, the united States led 
not only the economic development of the world, but its 
technological development, as well. The two go hand in hand. As 
Japan developed, though, it was able to adapt basic scientific 
advancements from other countries, especially the U.S., and turn 
them into usable and marketable technologies faster than the parent 
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country could. It was thus able to exploit technology and produce 
cheaper, higher quality products, in for example the steel 
industry. 
While America still leads in basic science research, it is now 
losing the battle to bring these new advances to the new market the 
quickest. G3 The problem, then, is not in the basic research, it 
is in converting this research into a usable technology; after all, 
science and technology are two different animals. 64 Thus, America 
is no longer as competitive in developing new technology as it was. 
The questions then are what can be done to restore America's 
technological competitiveness?, and how can R&D policy help America 
regain its competitive edge in technology development? 
In order to answer the first question, areas where R&D are 
lagging need to be identified. It has already been mentioned that 
the u.s. is still leading in basic science, but is faltering in the 
race to develop technology from it quickly. It therefore makes 
sense to put more effort into developing the basic science that 
America can still do better than anyone else into usable 
technologies. By pushing development, America can bring the new 
technologies to market quicker and have a more competitive position 
in new markets and industries that will be born in the future. 
Answering the second question also helps answering the first 
question. Consider the current makeup of federal R&D spending as 
in Chart 4. The chart shows that in 1988, almost 70% of the 
federal R&D budget was spent in the Department of Defense, and just 
above 30% on "civilian" R&D. with the soviet Union extinct and no 
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major power surfacing as an enemy, there is an increasing call for 
the government to cut defense spending, especially on R&D. While 
cutting R&D may not sound like it would help the economy, in this 
case it can. 
Military R&D and NASA R&D, like "Big Science" projects such 
as the Superconducting Super Collider (Dept. of Energy) do not have 
any readily commercial benefits. Therefore, less than 27% of the 
federal R&D budget is going for civilian purposes, to help promote 
new technologies and developments that can help American 
competitiveness. These projects are often more modest in scope, 
but have a higher impact per dollar than the big ticket items. It 
therefore can help the economy if the R&D can be adjusted to show 
a prototypical distribution reflecting parity among commercial and 
non-commercial 'concerns , such as Chart 5. This shows what a future 
distribution may look like, if the defense/civilian R&D split 
returned to pre-1980 levels. 65 This division reflects the future 
prospects of both the defense and civilian R&D requirements in the 
battle for federal funding. Policies should be implemented to get 
civilian R&D, the more modest proposals that can really have high 
benefit per dollar ratios, and defense/non commercial spending to 
relatively equal levels. 
Once money is allocated to civilian R&D, where does it go? 
There are three possibilities. It can go to a government lab, a 
private company, or a university. More and more, the funds are 
being used jointly by two or more of these groups. Cooperative 
Research And Development Agreements (CRADAS) help both the private 
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and government sectors by sharing R&D costs. They are temporary 
agreements, semi-market driven, with set targets, and the results 
eventually become common property. 66 Their use in the federal R&D 
plan is growing, as the private sector is more willing to share the 
costs this way. Also, government research grants to universities 
are tending to increase as well, showing greater cooperation and 
interdependency among the academic, pUblic, and private sectors of 
the nation. 
The changing face of government R&D, in its distribution among 
government departments and the increasing involvement of the 
private and academic sectors, will help increase the 
competitiveness of American firms as new products can be developed 
here. The questions remain, though, how could the government's 
industrial policy help America regain technological 
competitiveness, and what has President Clinton proposed for a 
science/technology/R&D policy? 
Government policy can help increase American competitive 
positioning by focusing on the process of developing new and better 
technologies. As stated earlier, the problem lies not in the 
research, but in the development end of the spectrum. Therefore, 
the government should offer incentives, maybe in the form of tax 
breaks and/or priority in CRADAs and other R&D projects, to 
encourage firms to develop the products faster. Also one problem 
may be that too many people are not getting enough information. 
To this end, and technological extension service, similar to the 
agricultural service, should be formed to teach companies and 
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manufacturers about the latest technologies available for their 
61use. 
Another concern some authors have is that American firms have 
not realized how technology development has changed since WWII. 
Traditionally, development flowed in a straight line from research. 
Today, though, there is no direct line from basic research to 
teohnology; it is more of a fusion of several different processes 
into one technology.E8 This makes consolidation and resource 
sharing all the more important as a tool of American R&D policy, 
because it can accelerate the rate at which ideas can be shared and 
fused into a usable technology. 
Hence, the government should first equalize defense and 
civilian R&D, and promote incentives which will stimulate 
development of -new technologies. This can include cooperation with 
the private and academic sectors, an organization that can help 
consolidate new technologies and teach people how to use them, ,and 
to develop a "database" so that different research can be joined 
together to develop a new technology quicker. President Clinton, 
though, has made some proposals which fit in very well with this 
plan of attack. 
Clinton has made several proposals in this area. First, he 
promised that "for every dollar we reduce the defense bUdget on 
research and development, we'll increase the civilian R&D budget 
by the same amount. ,,69 He also will make the R&D tax credit 
permanent, and propose a 50% tax credit to long-term investors in 
new businesses. 70 He further states that "at the very least, 10% 
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of the $76 billion that the government now spends on research 
should be redirected from the pentagon's research budget to 
civilian efforts. tl 7l These proposals are designed to help stimulate 
R&D and technology growth. This will in theory boost 
competitiveness in current and future industries that rely on ever 
advancing technology in order to be competitive. He wants to boost 
science and technology, especially the latter, which have declined, 
and as a result, so has America's competitiveness. 
IV. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MODEL 
Both economics and politics are disciplines where general 
consensus is rarely achieved. The question of feasibility, then, 
ultimately depends on the perspective taken by the reader. The 
mainstream economic theory is neoclassical economics. Political 
realism assumes that politicians' goals are to get re-elected. 
Since these are the mainstream paradigms, they are employed here, 
as well. After a discussion of the respective frameworks, a 
methodology incorporating them will be developed that can evaluate 
industrial policy proposals put forth by the Clinton 
administr tion. 
The Theories 
The Economic Model 
In order for the policy to be successful, it must help 
American firms compete internationally. Therefore, the proper 
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economic model must focus on America's position in international 
trade. The mainstream approach to international trade economics 
is the neoclassical model of indifference curve analysis72 There• 
are several important implications of this framework. First, when 
productivity declines relative to the rest of the world, 
competitiveness suffers, as costs are increasing relative to the 
rest of the world. Second, tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTB's) 
are commonly used to protect a domestic market and/or industry from 
foreign competition; there is economic gain from such protectionist 
measures for those countries that employ them, relative to the more 
open markets. Given the implications of the neoclassical model, 
an industrial policy that focuses on improving productivity and 
either opening all markets or using tariffs and NTB's to augment 
its strategy can prove very effective for a country wishing to reap 
economic gains from the international marketplace. Our focus will 
be on policies aiming at increasing productivity. 
The Political Model 
The political framework is relatively simple. A politicians' 
main goal is to get re-elected, or put in different terms, to 
maximize his/her probability of re-election. American politicians 
are theoretically very sensitive to their constituencies in the 
sense that they will re-elect him in as little as two years. They 
cannot afford to do anything for the long run if it means 
committing political suicide in the short run. Since the House of 
Representatives is re-elected every two years, and the Senate 
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serves 6-year terms, this can produce some very myopic policy. 
Political plausibility, then, entails several elements for its 
framework. First, it must allow that Congresspeople and Senators 
can get re-elected in the short run, while the policies are 
intrinsically long run. Second, it must reach across party lines 
and appeal to both Democrats and Republicans. Third, it must be 
cost effective, as big bUdget items are generally met with 
disapproval by the electorate. 
Methodology 
A proposed industrial policy must be evaluated on both its 
economics and politics. In order to evaluate its economics, goals 
of what an industrial policy should achieve should be kept in mind. 
Put simply, tfiis is increased competitiveness in the global market 
place. As noted above, this can theoretically have two parts: 
increasing productivity or ensuring a "level playing field" in the 
international market. Hence, the economic feasibility of a 
proposal should hinge on whether it help foster growth in one or 
both of these areas, and how it would so. Simply put, does the 
proposal help foster increased competitiveness? By what means? 
These are not the only questions that can determine economic 
plausibility, though. If there is a better economic alternative 
(political acceptance notwithstanding for the moment), it should 
be ranked even more feasible than the previous proposal. The 
proposals, then, can be ranked in order of preference on the 
condition of feasibility. For example, a treaty that would 
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eliminate tariffs and NTB's in all nations would be favored to one 
that increases tariffs. Both do have economically sound 
strategies, though. If these were the only two policies being 
considered, in terms of feasibility, the tariff elimination is more 
economically sound, and would be reflected in a ranking of 1, while 
the tariff hike would be ranked second. 
Ranking different proposals can be very helpful in selecting 
the optimal policy. However, it again depends on the individual 
analyst; it is by no means an objective ranking like a list of GPA 
scores would be; it simply reflects which policy proposal the 
individual would prefer over another. 
Political feasibility is analyzed in the same way, with the 
different proposals being ranked in terms of political feasibility. 
Political feasibility depends on the effect on a given politician's 
chance for re-election, the nature of bipartisanship surrounding 
the proposal, and its total cost. For example, raising an income 
tax on the middle class is politically unfeasible, because voters 
tend to replace those representatives that vote for a tax hike. 
The more Republicans and Democrats agree on a course of action, the 
more politically viable a resolution becomes and the higher it is 
ranked in this category. Likewise, cost can undermine the 
political possibility if it is too high. 
Now suppose that the two proposals, a tariff reduction and the 
tariff hike, are evaluated for their political feasibility. Here, 
the tariff hike could be more feasible, because it could be cheaper 
to implement, and less risky to pass. Therefore the hike would get 
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a ranking of 1, while the reduction would be ranked 2. Again, 
these rankings are highly sUbjective, depending upon an 
individual's own point-of-view. 
The next problem is how to combine political and economic 
feasibility into the same model. Once the rankings have been 
established for both parts, the temptation to simply add them 
together, and prefer the lower composite score, is great. However, 
considering the example developed here, the simple sum is as 
follows: 
policy Economic ± Political = TOTAL 
TARIFF HIKE 2 1 3 
TARIFF REDUCTION 1 2 3 
How then is the final decision in this case? Both plans are 
equally feasible overall. How does Congress decide? Given the 
political realities of the decision-making bodies, they probably 
attach more weight to the political aspect than the economic. This 
makes sense, given that politicians will focus on re-election, not 
necessarily on what is good for the economy if it conflicts with 
their political aspirations. To weight the political feasibility, 
simply mUltiply it by 2. This gives more weight to political 
considerations over economic factors. The table then may look like 
this: 
(Weighted) 
Policy Economic + Political ­ TOTAL 
TARIFF HIKE 2 2 4 
TARIFF REDUCTION 1 4 5 
44 
Here, the decision, is clear. With the weight to the political 
factors, the decision is for the tariff hike in this example. 
One problem that is apparent is the problem of the scalar. 
For simplicity, I chose a weight of 2. This works well when only 
two policies are being considered. When more than two are 
compared, the weight given to political feasibility does matter. 
Thus, if more than two policies are being compared, special 
attention must be paid to the weight. Here, however, since only 
two policies are being compared, the weight does not matter. 
The model then, simply ranks the weighted preferences for 
policies with both economic and political components, as such: 
Total Rank = Economic Rank + 2*Political Rank 
for each policy proposal. These rankings will implicitly reflect 
the costs and benefits, both economic and political, of the various 
policies. It cannot, however, serve as a measure of magnitude 
between the pOlicies, i.e. how much policy 1 is preferred to policy 
2, and so on. It is also possible that the number one policy 
preference is to do nothing pursue. This option can simply be 
reflected as a policy choice among the alternatives. 
Each proposal, then, will be ranked against a null hypothesis. 
The null hypothesis here is that what the government does now, in 
terms of policy and spending, will not increase. The policy with 
the lowest total will be the more feasible of the two policies, and 
is the one that should be preferred. 
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TABLE 2 
Clinton's Industrial Policy Proposals 
Infrastructure 
Pl Increase infrastructure investment by $l34b over the next 
four years. 
Education 
P2 Improve early childhood education (fully fund Head start). 
P3 Revamp the college financial aid program. 
P4 Initiate job training/ apprenticeship programs for non­
college bound students. 
P5 A European-style tax cut for companies sponsoring worker 
training. 
Science, Technology, and R&D 
P6 Decrease defense R&D by at least 10%. 
P7 Match every dollar decrease in defense R&D with a dollar 
increase in civilian R&D. 
P8 Make the R&D tax credit permanent. 
P9 A 50% ta~ credit to long-term investors in new businesses. 
==;====:=-=========================-=:=========================================== 
Sources: see text under the Contents of Industrial Policy 
section. The numbers Pl through P9 simply refer to proposal 
1 through 9. 
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important factor to consider, especially against a do-nothing 
policy that can plunge America into further economic decline. For 
these reasons, the economic rank is 2, as is the political rank. 
Infrastructure 
The first proposal is Clinton's plan to increase 
infrastructure investment by $134 billion over the next four years. 
Economically, this is a very good proposal, as "countries that 
provide high public investment in infrastructure experience higher 
productivity growth,1t73 and also economic growth. 74 The American 
infrastructure is decaying, and will continue to do so until 
Congress decides to appropriate funds for it. It is better than 
doing nothing because productivity should grow as the investment 
is completed, thus helping our competitiveness. 
Politically, however, it is more feasible to do nothing. 
While congress recognizes the need for more infrastructure 
investment, Clinton is asking for them to cut the budget deficit 
and try to pass a multi-billion dollar infrastructure bill at the 
same time, with no or few specific spending cuts. President 
Clinton has some pet projects, namely health care reform, that he 
considers a higher priority over infrastructure investment. Given 
this environment, and the treatment of the economic stimulus bill 
in the Senate recently, it would be very surprising to Congress 
enact an infrastructure investment bill. 
Clinton's infrastructure proposal does not fare well here. 
While it is the more economically sound, and receives aI, the 
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political ranking is 4, for a total of 5. Compared with the null 
hypothesis that government infrastructure spending stay at current 
levels, with a total of 4 (2 and 2 respectively), this proposal 
would fail. 
Education 
In his attempt to reform education, Clinton has made several 
policy proposals. First is to improve early childhood education 
by fUlly funding Head start. To analyze its economic feasibility, 
consider the cost of the program to reach every eligible child. 
In cold economic terms, the opportunity cost to the government is 
extremely high. Obviously, the benefits are apparent, because 
students in Head start can begin school at the same level as their 
peers, and will increase their human capital investment so that 
they can compete. However, if given a choice between fully funding 
Head start and infrastructure investment, the infrastructure 
investment is probably the more economically viable of the two. 
Politically, on the other hand, if Congress can again come up 
with some of the money, they may be willing to fund it fully over 
doing nothing at all. First, it is in essence a social program, 
too, that can help impoverished children have a fighting chance to 
escape destitution. Second, it is a long-run measure designed to 
help increase the productivity of the future work force, if 
Congress will want to see it as that way. Third, it has the 
appearance of "putting people ahead of economics" because its 
social ramifications are more observable than its economic 
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implications. For these reasons, it is a politically viable 
alternative. This does not mean Congress will or should pass the 
program, it simply says that it could be better for them to pass 
it than to do nothing. 
The second education proposal is to revamp the college 
financial aid system. This will allow more people to be better 
trained, which improves the overall education and productivity of 
the labor force in the long run, because college is more affordable 
in the short run. Economically, this is feasible, as it is a long­
term R&D investment that can payoff dividends well into the 
future. There has always been a correlation between higher 
education and higher productivity, so economically it is a sound 
proposal. 
Politically, though, it is hard to estimate. On the one hand, 
the problem of where the money is coming from lessens the chance 
for it to pass. On the other hand, it too can pass as a social 
program that can show that Congress is helping the people. Very 
few people are happy with the financial aid system today, though, 
parents students, and educators alike. Therefore, there is 
considerable impetus from the academic and household sectors for 
the government to initiate some type of reform. In addition to 
this I the House Education and Labor committee, which has been 
gridlocked the past four years, is just now realizing that it can 
end the gridlock conveniently enough for Clinton to step into the 
White House. It may be likely, therefore, that political 
cooperation on education issues will increase, which may make the 
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financial aid reform idea more politically feasible than doing 
nothing at all. 
The third of the four education proposals is the job training 
apprenticeship programs. Economically, this human capital 
investment is a very sound idea, if the jobs are available; it 
doesn't do the workers any good to train for nonexistent jobs. 
Therefore, a gener 1 type of training must be undertaken that can 
be adapted to new and better technologies, and the government and 
companies must be willing to retrain workers for the new and 
different jobs. Once these guidelines are set, the labor force 
moves from unskilled to skilled, and can be more productive and 
therefore competitive in the future, an economically sound idea, 
that Morton Kondracke says may be Cl inton' s best. 75 
Like the: other education proposals, this idea is also 
politically feasible, depending on how Congress wants to tackle the 
deficit, if at all. The added advantage this program has, 
especially for the Democrats, is the addition of large number of 
potentially employed blue collar workers that become voters in the 
very short run. If the program works, the current Congress, and 
the Democrats in particular, can stand to gain an entire blue 
collar generation to its side if the program succeeds. In 
addition, this is one of the top programs that President Clinton 
wants enacted, so as a pet project of a newly elected Chief 
Executive, it becomes even more politically viable. This plan is 
then both economically and politically feasible. 
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The final education proposal is also both economically and 
politically feasible. This is the European-style tax cut for 
companies sponsoring worker training. Economically, it will 
effectively subsidize worker training, making it less costly to 
compete, and/or increasing the number of people that can be 
trained. Either way, the economic ramifications of a tax cut will 
spur worker training and help to increase productivity. 
Politically, a tax cut is always acceptable. However, for 
Clinton and the current Congress who are dealing with a variety of 
tax increases, showing the ability to cut a couple of taxes for the 
purpose of spurring investment growth (supply-side economics)" may 
be a meaningful concession to get the GOP behind some of the 
proposals. By relying on a supply-side tax cut t the Democrats can 
show a willingness to compromise, which increases their bargaining 
position for some more divisive issues down the road. The bottom 
line is, though, that a tax cut is virtually always politically 
acceptable, even in the face of a budget deficit crisis that faces 
this country. 
R&D 
The R&D proposals also have interesting economic and political 
ramifications. First are the twin proposals to cut defense R&D by 
at least 10%, and to match this with an increase in civilian R&D. 
Economically, this simply reallocates government money to areas 
where it can benefit the American economy the most in terms of 
increasing R&D support and developing new technologies. This will 
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help develop new technologies, which can lower production costs, 
and also increase productivity. By maintaining the status quo, 
civilian R&D remains vastly underfunded, the military overfunded, 
especially in the post- Cold War era, and the economy loses a 
valuable source of potential R&D growth. For these reasons, these 
proposals are economically viable. 
Politically, the substantial decrease in available R&D moneys 
will not make special interests within the military-industrial 
complex particularly happy. However, as the military is being 
downsized, it makes sense to shift R&D from the military to 
civilian pursuits. The proposal is deficit-proof, because it 
simply reallocates funds from one source to another; the overall 
balance stays the same. Plus it has an increased economic benefit 
for the private sector at a relatively low opportunity cost for the 
government. It therefore makes sense that the government would 
enact these proposals, at least in part. 
The third proposal Clinton makes for R&D is to make the R&D 
tax credit permanent. This is both economically and politically 
correct, and a concession to supply-side economists of both 
parties, for many of the same reasons that the worker training tax 
cut is acceptable both on economic and political terms. It is 
always politically advantageous to cut a tax, especially if people 
expect tax increases. 
The same holds true for the fourth and final proposal, the R&D 
tax credit of 50% to long-term investors in new businesses. 
Unfortunately, the economics behind this proposal are not as sound 
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as the politics. By providing a tax incentive, the government 
tacitly hopes that more people will invest in new business. the 
number of businesses then goes up, which increases competition. 
Unless the government specifies the industries which would get the 
tax break, if there are restrictions, this does not help increase 
the R&D or productivity at all. It is therefore a misguided 
industrial policy, despite its political correctness. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained here suggest that for the most part, 
Clinton's industrial policy proposals are feasible when ranke 
against what the government is doing now. These results are not 
infallible, however, as there are several problems that this 
research has encountered. These problems force readers to be 
cautious when interpreting the data, and reduce the overall level 
of condfidence in the results. Despite these misgivings, however, 
the results seem to suggest that Clinton's policy proposals may be 
able to work. Further research is needed to develop a more 
objective method of analysis and better data, and to evaluate other 
proposals, as well. 
Results 
Table 3 provides a summary of the Clinton proposals, and how 
they fared against the null proposals. Generally, Clinton I s 
proposals turn out fairly favorable against the null hypothesis. 
This makes a case in general for an industrial policy, containing 
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TABLE 3 
Clinton's Industrial Policy Proposals Evaluated 
Feasibility 
(Weighted) 
Policy Economic Political Total 
Agency 
ESC 1 4 5 
Null 2 2 4 
Infrastructure 
PI I 4 5 
Null 2 2 4 
Education 
P2 2 2 4 
Null 1 4 5 
P3 1 2 3 
Null 2 4 6 
P4 1 2 3 
Null 2 4 6 
P5 1 2 3 
Null 2 4 6 
R&D 
P6 & P7 1 2 3 
Null 2 4 6 
pa 1 2 3 
Null 2 4 6 
P9 2 2 4 
Null 1 4 5 
==========::::::::=========='========:::===.===================::::=====.===== 
Source: the text. The null total is the toal value that the nu 
hypothesis received, which was to keep the current governm 
in place. For example, P2 ranked as more feasible than th 
hypothesis, because it had a lower score, 4 to 5. 
at least some of these proposals. The only policy that would not 
prove to be more feasible than the null hypothesis is the first 
policy, increasing infrastructure investment. In many ways, it is 
definitely the most economically sound of the proposals. However, 
compared to the public attention on education and private sector 
concern over R&D policy, infrastructure becomes politically 
unacceptable. Politics in this example can effectively undermine 
a very sound economic proposal. 
This research also suggests that programs that pay for 
themselves, such as the combination of policies 6 and 7, are going 
to be more politically OK than ones which require new spending. 
The source of this new spending for the infrastructure program was 
not specified. As a result, it would have added over $130b to the 
federal deficit. Considering the deficit itself is one of 
Clinton's pet projects, he shoots himself in the foot on the 
infrastructure investment. The change in R&D distribution does not 
face this problem, because it merely is a transfer of funds from 
one department to another, without changing the balance of the 
deficit. It is therefore deficit-proof, and programs which can be 
deficit-proof will also be politically feasible. 
These preliminary conclusions also imply that education reform 
and improvement could be a very feasible undertaking politically. 
This seems to contradict the fact that not one meaningful piece of 
legislation came out of the last Congress. This may be due 
primarily to partisanship; for the first time in 12 years, a 
Democrat is in the White House. This could signal a new era of 
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cooperation between the legislative and executive branches that was 
notoriously absent during the latter part of the decade. 
Aside from these general conolusions, though, not much can be 
said, due to the restrictions of the model and the data. While the 
research here supports the hypothesis that industrial policy as 
construed by the Clinton administration is better than no policy, 
this can only extend to those specific policies covered within the 
scope of this paper. There are other aspects of an industrial 
policy, such as NTB and tariff policy, which were not analyzed, but 
in a full-blown analysis, would be by necessity evaluated as part 
of the entire policy. 
Also, the other proposals that Clinton has proposed under the 
guise of industrial policy may not have the same rate of acceptance 
(8 out of 9) that these particular policies did. One cannot infer 
anything about the success of the former from the latter, other 
than it is likely that similar proposals addressing different 
topics may be more likely to pass. There is very little that can 
be inferred from this data, short of the general feasibility of 
industrial policy in the United states. 
Problems and Limitations 
There are several problems in this presentation that can be 
ironed out with further research. They can be divided into two 
sets, problems with the model and problems with the data. Through 
more refined research and theoretical development, these problems 
can be overcome in future endeavors so that a more solid and 
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comprehensive analysis of industrial policies can occur. 
The first set of problems and limitations concerns the model. 
First, it is in essence a subjective ranking based on opinion about 
any economic and political theory the author holds true. It 
therefore loses any and all comparability with another person's 
ranking criterion. A more sophisticated model that takes objective 
criterion into formulaic consideration is needed to try and 
objectively analyze what are the economic and political 
consequences of certain proposals. While this particular 
limitation significantly hampers this research, this model 
nevertheless is worthwhile, because it opens the door to a new mode 
of thinking about how Congress mayor should approach decision­
making about the economy. This model serves as a first step in the 
right direction, not as the finished product. 
Another limitation of the model, as discussed before, is that 
it cannot tell the magnitude of a particular policy's feasibility. 
The more feasible of two policies, for instance, may not be in 
reality feasible at all. The model presented here cannot take this 
into account, so the conclusions that can be drawn from it are 
limited. Further development of the model is necessary to deduce 
a more sophisticated approach that can represent the magnitude of 
the distance between the individual policy prescriptions. 
Despite these problems and limitations, this model serves its 
purpose well. As stated earlier, it is a first step in researching 
industrial policy implications in the future. Also, it can provide 
a good comparison of two proposals, especially pitting one proposal 
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against doing nothing, the null proposal, as this research has 
done. This gives a general idea of whether an undertaking such as 
industrial policy is worth undertaking, or whether it is better to 
do nothing. 
The model is not the sole source of problems and limitations 
for this type of research, though. The data also has some 
limitations that can dampen any conclusions drawn from this 
endeavor. First, only a few selected proposals and/or campaign 
promises that President Clinton has made have been studied here. 
Therefore there may not be a comprehensive look at what his overall 
industrial policy may look like. Without all the individual 
policies, it is impossible to evaluate the overall industrial 
policy Clinton has proposed; this research can only pass judgment 
on certain aspects of the proposed policy. 
Second, to trUly feel how this policy would stand up, other 
industrial policies should be analyzed in the same way, and,put 
against the Clinton plan. It would even suffice to take individual 
components from several people's ideas and evaluate them and this 
plan at the same time. This gives more alternatives, and is more 
difficult, but the results indicate better what direction the 
policy should lie in. 
The data would be much more concrete if actual costs and 
benefits could be estimated about the programs. This would enable 
the model to be more objective as well, as it would partially be 
based some objective facts and figures. Data such as this also 
provides the researcher with an implicit measure of magnitude in 
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the difference between net benefit levels between the proposals. 
However, data of this type is very expensive to collect, and simply 
could not be obtained for this project. 
Problems such as these can be corrected in future research 
undertaken in this vein. For now, however, the research must draw 
its conclusions based on the data and the model's results. This 
data must be analyzed for its implications and evaluations of the 
policy prescriptions. Obviously a new policy prescription will 
emanate from this data. This research shows, that in spite of the 
problems associated with the model and the data, the policy 
proposals of Bill Clinton are more or less economically sound and 
politically viable, and that an inclusive industrial policy can 
help American productivity and therefore its competitiveness. 
Despite the limitations of both the data and the model, the 
research indicates that the industrial policy of the Clinton 
acbninistration, when compared to government inaction, is worthwhile 
and both economically and more importantly politically feasible. 
The only aspect of the nine policies proposed that failed here was 
the infrastructure policy. This is not to say it won't pass, but 
it is far more likely for Congress to do nothing on infrastructure 
than to adopt this proposal. More comprehensive research needs to 
be done in this area, but general indications are that America can 
indeed benefit from an industrial policy like the one considered 
here. 
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